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ABSTRACT  
The creation of a Free Trade Area is the main pillar on which regionalization in the 
Mediterranean has been pursued since the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership in 1995. The aim of this paper is to reflect upon the relation between 
commercial integration and region-building in the Mediterranean from an interpretative 
perspective, in order to offer a critical evaluation of the aims, the impact and the 
evolution of Euro-Mediterranean policies. To this end, we will show some evidence about 
the intensity and spatiality of cross-Mediterranean trade relations. We will see how the 
idea of constructing a Mediterranean region does indeed coexist and conflict with other 
geographical imaginaries: the idea of the Mediterranean as a border and the attempts to 
establish a regime of managed and differential relations in the area. Moreover, we will 
present the different delimitations which have been proposed for the Euro-Mediterranean 
area, in order to give an idea of the struggle between alternative geopolitical 
representations which is behind regionalization strategies in the Mediterranean. We will 
discuss the attempts to use conditionality to promote reforms in the partner countries, 
and the Eurocentric character of such attempts. Finally, we will reflect upon the concept 
of ‘selective’ Europeanization: the spatial metaphor that, in our opinion, best captures the 
content and the outcome of the recurrent attempts to construct a Mediterranean region. 
 
Classification JEL: F5, O24, F13, N74 
Keywords: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European Neighbourhood Policy, 
commercial integration, regionalization, Europeanization. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (EMP), in 
1995, the EU has been dedicating considerable political and financial 
resources to the management of relations with Mediterranean countries.  
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The content of Euro-Mediterranean strategies, as we will see in the next 
sections, were not entirely new with respect to the policies that European 
countries had been previously conducting bilaterally with non-EU 
Mediterranean countries. What was new was the greater emphasis on their 
regional dimension: the idea of conducting those policies multilaterally at the 
level of the whole basin, and the prospects for integration and 
regionalization in the area, reflecting a growing belief among European 
political elites that a Mediterranean region can be ‘made’ (Bialasiewicz et al. 
2009, 83). 
The creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA) is the main pillar on which 
regionalization in the Mediterranean has been pursued in the last two 
decades. The idea of establishing a FTA was the first, and is still, one of the 
most important components of Euro-Mediterranean policies, although those 
policies have evolved and diversified since the prospects for a FTA was first 
formulated, in 1995, during the Barcelona Conference. 
The aim of this paper is to reflect upon the relation between commercial 
integration and regionalization in the Mediterranean from an interpretative 
perspective. In order to highlight the complexity and ambiguities which are 
implied in the attempts to construct a Mediterranean region, we will offer a 
review of how Euro-Mediterranean policies evolved, what their explicit and 
implicit goals are and upon which geographical imaginaries those policies 
are constructed, in light of the function that the creation of a Free Trade 
Area is supposed to play in this frame.  
In the next section, we will offer some evidence about the intensity and 
spatiality of cross-Mediterranean trade relations and reflect upon both the 
expected and actual results of commercial integration in the area. In section 
three, we will show how the idea of constructing a Mediterranean region 
does indeed coexist, complement and conflict with other geographical 
imaginaries: namely the idea of the Mediterranean as a border to be 
securitized and the attempts to establish a regime of managed and 
differential relations in the area. In section four, we will present the different 
delimitations which have been proposed for the Euro-Mediterranean area in 
order to give an idea of the struggle between alternative geopolitical 
representations which is behind regionalization strategies in the 
Mediterranean. In section five we will discuss the issue of conditionality in 
Euro-Mediterranean policies: the attempts to promote political and economic 
reforms in the partner countries and the Eurocentric character of such 
attempts. In the final section we will offer some concluding remarks and 
reflect upon the issue of Europeanization: the spatial metaphor that, in our 
opinion, best captures the content and the outcome of the recurrent 
attempts to construct a Mediterranean region. 
 
 
 
 
2. FREE TRADE AND REGIONALIZATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN  
 
The strategy toward the creation of a Free Trade Area in the 
Mediterranean was first formulated during the Barcelona conference, in 
1995, upon the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
between the European Union, its member states and 12 non-EU 
Mediterranean partners. 
The EMP was not the first1 yet surely the most ambitiously coordinated 
and multilateral effort to establish a common policy toward the 
Mediterranean. The content of the initiative, as we argued earlier, was not 
entirely new. The FTA, for example, was supposed to include all 
Mediterranean countries that, since the 1970s, had already signed trade 
agreements with the EU. In addition to the establishment of the FTA, the 
partnership aimed at increasing the financial support the EU had 
traditionally directed toward non-EU Mediterranean countries. What was 
defined as the “Barcelona process” attempted only to make those efforts 
more systematic and more ambitious.  
What was new was more the container rather than the content: the idea of 
a multilateral partnership (plus Free Trade Area) regarding the whole 
Mediterranean basin. Such an emphasis on regionality reflected a belief that 
a Mediterranean region does indeed exist and that commercial, economic 
and social integration in the Mediterranean should constitute one of the 
main priorities for European foreign politics. 
Given the prioritization of trade liberalization, some critics accuse the EMP 
for being an attempt by European countries to reinforce their economic 
hegemony in the Mediterranean and to increase the economic dependence 
of Southern Mediterranean countries (Amoroso 2007, Attinà 2003). 
The Barcelona Process is not, however, exclusively a commercial 
strategy; it is a more ambitious process whose final aim is to turn “the 
Mediterranean region into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation” 
(Barcelona Declaration, 1995).  
In terms of commercial relations, the Mediterranean indeed ceased to be 
a crucial region for global trade in the Seventeenth Century (Braudel 1985, 
53). The EU is an important commercial partner for some non-EU 
Mediterranean countries (Tunisia and Libya, and, to a lesser extent, Algeria 
and Morocco). If we exclude energy resources, however, cross-
Mediterranean trade relations are minimal (Figure 1), and they have even 
been decreasing in recent years, due to the increase of exchanges with 
Asian countries. South-south exchanges are even weaker, as they account 
for only 5 percent of the total trade of non-European Mediterranean 
countries (Cugusi 2009, 48). “At the present time, it cannot be said that 
there is a system of international trade between the countries of the 
Mediterranean” (Tovias-Bacaria 1999, 5).  
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Figure 1 - Average yearly trade exchange in Mediterranean countries, 2008-2010 
Source: designed by the authors based on UNCTAD Trade Statistics 
 
The Mediterranean recently became an important hub for container traffic, 
for example, and many Mediterranean ports (Port Said, Malta, Gioia Tauro, 
Algeciras and Tanger among the others) are trying to accommodate this 
renewed centrality and to gain competitive advantages with respect to 
northern European ports. Container traffic, however, is for the most part 
directed far away from the Mediterranean shores and it cannot be said to 
display regionalizing effects.  
Such evidence shows, first, that trade liberalization in the Euro-
Mediterranean has not experienced the effects that were initially expected. 
Most observers agree on this point and many other criticisms have been 
raised with respect to the EU’s strategy toward commercial integration. The 
component of Euro-Mediterranean politics that has progressed the most 
(even if many think it has not progressed enough), is indeed trade 
liberalization for manufacturing products. Although the 2010 deadline for the 
official establishment of the FTA was not met and has since been 
postponed, European countries have signed free trade agreements with the 
all of its Mediterranean external partners, with the exception of Syria and 
Libya.  
Critics have emphasized the asymmetry and neo-colonialism which is 
implicit in the prioritization of manufacturing trade - an industry in which 
European countries have relevant competitive advantages - and the 
protectionism that still characterizes other components of the so called “four 
freedoms” of regional integration: persons, goods, services and capital 
(Amoroso 2007, 507). Agricultural trade, for example, has been excluded 
from the initial prospects for the creation of the FTA, with the aim of 
safeguarding European agriculture and the European Agricultural Policy, 
given the comparative advantages that Southern Mediterranean countries 
have with respect to the EU in agricultural production (Tovias-Bacaria 
1999). This has raised much criticism and discontent in the partner 
countries. Consequently, the EU has recently upgraded preferential market 
access for agricultural and fisheries products from Egypt and Jordan, and 
several other agreements in this field are being negotiated or are at the 
approval stage, with Morocco, for example, also in the field of free trade in 
services (EU 2011).  
The prioritization of trade is surely indicative of a peculiar approach to 
regionalization. The strengthening of Euro-Mediterranean relations - it is 
argued - should first and foremost be based on strengthening commercial 
relations. Many authors have stressed that such prioritization is the result of 
a utilitarian and neoliberal ideology (Latouche 2007): “the economy comes 
first”. This is also coherent with the use of the term “partnership”, borrowed 
from the commercial domain to indicate that “partner” countries will remain 
fully autonomous, but they agree upon fostering commercial integration as 
long as - according to neoliberal ideologies - trade relations are mutually 
beneficial to all partners. 
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership can indeed be said to constitute a 
‘commercial’ approach toward regionalization, but the perspective on the 
establishment of a FTA is never considered an end in itself. The fostering of 
trade relations is rather supposed to be a ‘stick’ for fostering other kind of 
relations. The prioritization of free trade, in this frame, has much to do with 
the (Braudelian) idea that, in history, trade flows are the primary 
connections upon which any other (political, social or cultural) relation is 
constructed. Even if supporters of a truly integrated area would say that the 
FTA is not enough, most observers agree that it is a starting point for any 
kind of regionalization process: it is the history of European integration itself.  
Euro-Mediterranean politics, in the meanwhile, have evolved and 
diversified considerably, especially after the launch of the “European 
Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP) in the 2000s. The final aim of these policies 
should be “to share everything but institutions”, as famously declared by the 
former Head of the European Commission Romano Prodi in 2002. The idea 
is that relations between the EU and its neighbouring countries should 
somehow replicate the same degree of integration that exists among 
European countries, although Mediterranean partners have no prospect for 
accessing the EU because they are not “Europeans”2. 
Among the many differences between the EMP and the ENP, which will 
be analyzed more in detail in the next sections, we may say that the 
‘commercial’ approach that characterized Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
during the 1990s, has been replaced with a more explicitly ‘normative’ 
approach toward regionalization in the Mediterranean during the following 
decade. The ‘normative’ approach of the EU in its foreign policies has been 
highlighted by Manners (2002), indicating the EU’s preference for soft power 
with respect to the ‘harder’ power which is typical of US policies in the area, 
for example. Within the framework of Euro-Mediterranean policies, the 
approach is normative as long as it emphasizes the need to use trade and 
aid as ‘sticks’ to promote political reforms in non-EU countries, with a strong 
emphasis on the ‘civilising’ mission that the EU is supposed to play in the 
partner countries.  
Commercial integration and the establishment of a FTA continues to 
constitute a priority but it is more than ever a tool - rather than a goal in itself 
- within an ambitious strategy that aims at promoting inter-institutional 
dialogue, creating development and prosperity which, in turn, will cause 
peace, stability and the securitization of the Mediterranean frontier:  
 
“Our aim is a political one; political in the sense of stability. We got into this business of 
association agreements and free trade in order to engage them in the process of political 
reform, not so much because there was a general economic interest” (EU Official, cited 
in: Jones 2006, 424). 
 
It is to such ambivalences that we will now turn the attention, as they can 
offer a much better understanding of Euro-Mediterranean policies and of the 
role that trade liberalization is supposed to play in this frame: the apparent 
oxymora of a policy that aims at promoting the political transformation of 
Mediterranean countries, while at the same time seeks stability in the area 
(Balfour 2009, 104); the apparent contradiction between fostering 
regionalization in the region while at the same time promoting the 
securitization of the Mediterranean border. 
 
 
3. FREE TRADE AND THE GEOGRAPHICAL IMAGINERIES OF EURO-
MEDITERANEAN POLITICS  
 
There is an ambivalence regarding the geographical imaginaries that 
characterize any politics toward the Mediterranean: the tendency to 
consider the sea as a region, on the one hand, and the tendency to see it as 
a border, on the other. 
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Examples of the latter imaginary are frequent and they have gained 
prominence over the last decade, especially after September 11, 2001: the 
representation of the Mediterranean as a space of differences, as a 
boundary between clashing civilizations and as the locus of cross-border 
security threats such as illegal migration and terrorism. The most relevant 
advancements of European policies toward the Mediterranean, in recent 
years, are indeed aimed at the securitization of the EU’s external border 
through inter-governmental cooperation in the control of migration (Kausch-
Youngs 2009) or by strengthening the role of the EU in the military 
management of its external border (through the FRONTEX Agency).  
On the other hand, throughout their policies toward the Mediterranean, 
European institutions try hard to balance this emphasis on security by 
prioritizing other goals of cooperation – to promote “prosperity”, to address 
“common challenges”, to promote “common values”, etc. In those cases, the 
imaginary is constructed upon the tradition of seeing the Mediterranean as a 
“liquid continent” and as a historically unified space of homogeneity and 
continuity (Giaccaria-Minca 2011), hence making reference to a regional 
imagination. The problem is how to foster integration between countries that 
are otherwise considered very distant in political, social and cultural terms. 
The Braudelian idea of a Mediterranean region with a long history of 
relations that flourish thanks to geographical proximity, maritime connectivity 
and economic exchanges represents a strong narrative in this regard. It 
emphasizes a common belonging, a common history and – hopefully – a 
common future of increased cooperation, convergence, integration.  
Many authors have criticized Euro-Mediterranean policies for such 
ambivalence: they seek to regionalize the area by fostering integration 
while, at the same time, they strengthen the border between the enlarged 
EU and the outside world in many ways. Those policies promote the image 
of a borderless Euro-Mediterranean area, through the emphasis on 
cooperation, cross-border relations and “people-to-people contacts”, as 
much as they stress the securitization of the Mediterranean as their main 
goal and the control of migration as one of their main priorities (Beck and 
Grande 2007, 176). The image of a “fortress Europe” is an often cited 
spatial metaphor in this regard and – apparently – it contradicts the 
commitment toward regionalization in the Mediterranean.  
The parallel regionalization and bordering of the Mediterranean, however, 
is neither contradictory nor paradoxical: the two goals are intimately linked 
and produce a peculiar strategy that, although controversial, is coherent 
and, to a certain extent, effective. What these two imaginaries have in 
common - or where they find a synthesis - is in the representation of the 
Mediterranean as a space of relations and flows. 
European policies toward the Mediterranean may be seen, accordingly, as 
an attempt to create a regime of managed and differential mobility across 
the Mediterranean; an area of asymmetrical and controlled relations. Some 
flows that are considered beneficial - e.g. trade in industrial products - are 
fostered and enhanced while other flows - trade in agricultural products and 
services or “illicit trafficking”, for example - are limited. The same applies to 
migration which is considered beneficial or, at least, as a necessary evil, 
when it is managed, controlled and legal, and the opposite when it is 
unmanaged, uncontrolled or “irregular”. 
Consequently, in terms of geographical imaginaries we may identify a 
further alternative between topographical/territorial representations of the 
Mediterranean on the one hand (whenever the sea is considered as an 
integrated region or as a dividing border), and topological/relational 
representations on the other: when the Mediterranean is considered as a 
space of flows and relationships.  
Topological representation of sea spaces are indeed very common and, 
as stated by Steinberg in his historical analysis of oceans’ representation in 
cartography (2009), the construction of the sea as an ‘outside’ space of 
mobility is a fundamental ingredient in modern spatial politics as it is 
intimately linked to the construction of ‘inside’ space as a series of territories 
of fixity, sovereignty and stability.  
The various imaginaries of the Mediterranean are therefore not 
contradictory but complementary: in the next sections we will see further 
how they coexist and what their function is within the construction of a Euro-
Mediterranean political space. 
 
 
4. THE POLITICS OF DELIMITATION 
 
The first problem of any Mediterranean policy is how the area (or region?) 
should be delimited. The seemingly simple question of who’s Mediterranean 
and who’s not is indeed crucial in debates about regionalization and 
cooperation in the Mediterranean. The difficulties in compiling a list of 
“Mediterranean countries” in any meaningful and coherent way reveal a lot 
about the contents and scope of Euro-Mediterranean politics.  
The EMP, for example, initially excluded Libya as the country had been 
sanctioned by the United Nations; the country has been lately included in 
the partnership as an “observer”. On the other hand, the partnership 
includes Jordan and Mauritania, despite the fact that these two countries do 
not border the Mediterranean, because they are integral parts of Mashreq 
and Maghreb respectively. At the same time, the partnership excludes many 
other Arab countries based on the idea that those countries are not 
“Mediterranean”. 
Surprisingly enough, however, most of the problems incurred when 
deciding the boundaries of the Mediterranean are about which European 
countries - rather than about which non-European countries - should be 
included. All of the EU’s member countries are partners in the EMP. The 
partnership, consequently, includes many northern European countries that 
have some strategic or commercial interests in the basin, yet are far away 
from its shores, while it excludes other European Mediterranean countries - 
among the Western Balkans in particular - as long as they are not EU 
members. 
 
 
Figure 2. - Delimitations of the Euro-Mediterranean area within EU policies 
towards the Mediterranean 
Source: designed by the authors 
 
The number of partners, moreover, has progressively increased due to EU 
enlargement toward Eastern Europe, from 27 member countries in 1995 to 
40 today. Many fear the partnership is too wide in order to constitute the 
foundation for any proper regionalization process. “The Barcelona group is 
too diverse for a cross-pillar approach to be realistically formulated and 
implemented” (Pace 2004, 305). The creation of macro-regions in the 
Mediterranean, similar to the Baltic macro-region, has been recently 
discussed in this frame (Stocchiero 2010), with proposals for the constitution 
of an Adriatic-Ionian macro-region. Many others sub-regions have been 
previously identified, at various geographical scales, within the different 
components of Euro-Mediterranean policies (Celata-Coletti 2011). The 
delimitation of these sub-regions is never solely justified for functional 
reasons: sub-regional programmes refer often to some form of regional 
identity and are always aimed at “region-building”. 
The entire Mediterranean basin, however, is still the primary and most 
important scale for the implementation of EU external policies along the 
southern border of Europe, and this surely applies to the prospects for 
establishing a Free Trade Area. 
Debates about the geographical significance of the Euro-Mediterranean 
area have multiplied since the EU launched the so called “European 
Neighbourhood policy” (ENP), in 2003, which included 45 partners and was 
carried out with the participation of many Eastern European, non-member 
countries. Even the European Parliament expressed doubts about “the 
meaningfulness of the ENP’s geographical scope, as it involves countries 
which are, geographically and culturally, European together with 
Mediterranean non-European countries” (Resolution A6-0414-2007). “You 
cannot have a coherent policy for such heterogeneous countries” (EU 
official, cited in: Dimitrovova 2010, 472).  
Although the EU insisted that the ENP would “reinvigorate the Barcelona 
process” and the perspectives for integration in the Mediterranean, many 
feared the opposite: the new policy constituted a shift in the priorities of the 
EU toward its Eastern frontier (Aliboni 2005). The EMP was indeed the 
outcome of an EU enlargement in the 1980s and 1990s, with the accession 
of Spain, Portugal, Greece and – more recently – Cyprus and Malta. The 
ENP, on the other hand, was a response to the EU’s eastern enlargement 
and – according to many observers – was primarily concerned with the 
challenges that the enlargement would pose for the relations between 
Eastern European countries that have become member states and their 
non-EU neighbours (Zaiotti 2007, Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005).  
More generally, within the Barcelona Process, the Mediterranean 
constitutes the ‘centre’ of an ambitious multilateral project (even if the extent 
of the partnership was too wide to constitute a proper ‘Mediterranean 
region’). Within the ENP, on the contrary, “the Mediterranean is diluted into 
a disordered archipelago of countries surrounding the European and 
western ‘centre’” (Amoroso 2007, 496). The inclusion of both Eastern 
Europe and the Mediterranean within a single policy not only implies a 
further widening and extension of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, but 
also a symbolical shift. “The EMP stressed the importance of north-south 
and south-south cooperation, along with the notion of partnership. [The 
ENP], conversely, explicitly conveys a centre-periphery approach – with the 
EU obviously standing at the centre” (Del Sarto-Schumacher 2005, 27). 
Even if we cannot say that Euro-Mediterranean policies were ever truly 
multilateral (Giaccaria, 2005), the ENP has indeed been criticized for 
challenging the perspectives of a regional approach toward the Euro-
Mediterranean (Kausch-Youngs 2009, 965). “The ENP abandons the 
prevalence of the principle of regionality that was inherent in the Barcelona 
Process, and replaces it with differentiated bilateralism” (Del Sarto-
Schumacher 2005, 21).  
In brief, the ‘politics of delimitation’ is not neutral: the geographical 
coverage of different European policies towards the Mediterranean is both 
symbolic and performative, as it emphasizes certain political priorities over 
others, as well as it favours the interests of some countries over others. In 
this frame, the French proposal to establish a “Mediterranean Union”, in 
2007, was an explicit attempt to increase the centrality of Southern 
European countries with respect to, or even against, the leading role that 
continental Europe has within the EU. The proposal caused debates and 
criticisms especially because the Mediterranean Union was supposed to 
include only European and non European countries that border the 
Mediterranean (Balfour 2009, Kausch-Youngs 2009). The inclusion of only 
‘truly’ Mediterranean countries was, on the one hand, a response to the 
aforementioned criticisms about the EMP being too wide and about EU 
disengagement from the Mediterranean. On the other hand, such a 
geographical delimitation emphasized the commitment toward the 
establishment of a truly Mediterranean “Union”, rather than a simple 
multilateral partnership, and it was founded by French President Sarkozy 
upon a peculiar emphasis on ‘region building’ in the Mediterranean:  
 
“While Europe’s future is in the South, Africa’s is in the North. I call on all those who 
can do so to join the Mediterranean Union because it will be the linchpin of Eurafrica, the 
great dream capable of enthusing the world. The Mediterranean Union is a challenge, a 
challenge for all of us, (…) Mediterraneans” (Sarkozy, Morocco, October 2007). 
 
At the same time, paradoxically, the inclusion of only a few European 
countries was criticized because it challenged the ability of the EU to speak 
with a single voice in the area and, consequently, the perspectives for 
multilateralism in the Mediterranean, and contradicted the initial spirit of the 
EMP (Balfour 2009, 103). Even if the EU has recently conceded that 
regionalization in the area can proceed at “variable geometry” (EU 2011), 
the French proposal has been fiercely criticized not only by Northern 
European countries but also by Italy and Spain, as it was supposed to 
weaken the role of the EU.  
The proposal was quickly abandoned in favour of a less ambitious “Union 
for the Mediterranean” (UfM), established in 2008, which includes all 
countries that are part of the EMP, plus Monaco and the Western Balkans 
(with the exception of Serbia and Macedonia), and that is little more than a 
sum of projects with few prospects for regional integration (Kausch-Youngs 
2009). 
It is clear, from this brief review, that the idea that the Mediterranean 
“exists a priori”, based on the “natural evidence” of the physical extent of the 
sea (Giaccaria-Minca 2011, 348), is insufficient. The geography of the 
region is indeed suggesting its delimitation, as much as it is its product: it is 
just one ingredient in a never ending struggle between alternative 
geopolitical representations. In the end, we still need to decide both where 
the Mediterranean ends and what it is: the two questions are intimately 
linked. 
The various alternative delimitations, however, are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Although any of the above mentioned programmes has 
its own orientations, their goals are coherent and they can easily coexist. 
Each of those programmes includes, for example, perspectives for further 
commercial integration and trade liberalization. Perspectives for a Euro-
Mediterranean FTA, moreover, coexist and overlap with other trade 
agreements along the northern shore (EU, EEA and CEFTA), and along the 
southern shore: the COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa), the GAFTA (Greater Arab Free Trade Area), and the proposal for an 
Arab Maghreb Union (Figure 3), not to mention other inter-governmental 
partnerships such as the Arab League, which was included as a partner in 
the “Union for the Mediterranean”. 
The Mediterranean is therefore, in some cases, the object of 
regionalization attempts while, in many other cases, it is the crossroads of 
(or the border between) alternative integration processes: Europe, the 
European Union, the Arab countries, Maghreb, Mashreq, etc. 
The first point that we can deduce from this brief analysis, is that 
regionality and multilaterality should not be considered synonymous but are 
rather alternatives to each other. If the Mediterranean area is diluted to 
include the whole of Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, the 
possibilities for a multilateral policy for the area increase as relations can be 
managed at a multilateral level by supranational bodies such as the EU and 
the Arab League (Amoroso 2007). On the other hand, if the partnership is 
too wide, its geographical significance decreases and the perspectives for 
effective regionalization weaken. 
Another point refers to the above mentioned ambivalence between 
‘bordering’ processes versus regionalization processes in the 
Mediterranean. Any integration process weakens the borders among those 
that are included as much as it strengthens the borders with those that are 
excluded. The EU has been accused, for example, of challenging the 
association among Arab countries through the selective inclusion of some 
countries and the exclusion of others from the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership. Such inclusions/exclusions are dictated mainly by political and 
strategic criteria, but are masked behind the apparently self-evident idea 
that those countries which are excluded are not “Mediterranean countries” 3.  
Within this frame, the strongest divisions in the Mediterranean may be 
seen as resulting from European integration itself. European Union 
                                                 
3 The inclusion of Israel in the same basket with Arab countries, for example, is 
supposed to favour friendly relationships among those  countries, but has raised 
discontent from both parties. The exclusion of Iraq or Saudi Arabia, to give another 
example, is regarded by some observers as being aimed at excluding those countries in 
which the US has strong strategic interests.  
institutions seem to acknowledge this problem very clearly when declaring 
that their external policies should try to avoid the creation of new “dividing 
lines” (EC, 2004). The “dividing lines” that EU policies are trying to avoid do 
not only refer to historical and cultural divisions, but also to divisions that the 
EU integration process itself is creating through selective enlargement4, 
institutional and cultural bordering, militarization, etc.  
The perspective for increased freedom of movement for manufacturing 
products may therefore be not enough to promote a borderless 
Mediterranean. Euro-Mediterranean policies may be regarded as nothing 
more than a “consolation prize” the EU is offering to an area that, willing or 
not, it contributes to de-structure (Del Sarto-Schumacher 2005, 19). 
 
 
Figure 3. - Free Trade agreements in the Mediterranean area 
Source: designed by the authors 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 See the accession of Cyprus in the EU, for example, and the perspectives for including 
Turkey. 
5. EXCHANGING TRADE FOR DEMOCRACY? CONDITIONALITY  AND 
EUROCENTRISM IN EURO-MEDITERRANEAN POLICIES  
 
If we look at the latest evolutions of Euro-Mediterranean policies, it is clear 
that these policies are more European than Mediterranean: it is the EU that 
decides the scope of these strategies, which countries should be included or 
not, etc. Despite the attempts to promote partnership and co-ownership, 
Southern Mediterranean countries often only have the option of agreeing or 
not agreeing upon contents that the EU is proposing (El Kenz 2007, 530). 
Euro-Mediterranean policies, as already argued, have never been fully 
multilateral. Free trade agreements, for example, differently from other FTAs 
such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the European 
Free Trade Area (EFTA), are signed between the EU and each partner 
country individually. Some have defined it as a “hub and spoke” approach, 
which challenges the creation of a FTA for the whole area (Zaim 1999). The 
real issue, according to these critics, is in promoting south-south 
commercial relations. While trade barriers among Southern Mediterranean 
countries have decreased in the 1990s and 2000s, they are still some of the 
highest in the world. 
It is the EU, moreover, that provides the funding for Euro-Mediterranean 
policies and it is also the EU, consequently, that decides on their allocation. 
Although such allocation is traditionally based upon strategic and 
geopolitical priorities, there is an increasing emphasis - at least in theory - 
on conditioning the distribution of benefits from Mediterranean policies 
towards the implementation of political reforms and “good governance” in 
partner countries (Aliboni 2005).  
The Barcelona Process introduced the principle of “negative conditionality” 
which is, in theory, a suspension of relations with partner countries that 
have violated human rights. The ENP is instead based on the principle of 
“positive conditionality”: relations will be only fostered with those countries 
that express their commitment toward political reforms (Del Sarto-
Schumacher 2005). 
Such a ‘soft’ and ‘normative’ approach, as it has been defined in section 
two, has succeeded in keeping relations between the EU and its partners 
“cordial and constructive” (Emerson-Noutcheva 2005), with respect to the 
more problematic relations the US has with several Mediterranean 
countries, for example. However, the EU “has failed to use its more positive 
image (…) to set out an alternative reform path” (Youngs 2006). 
At times, there is the impression that European values themselves, as 
once stated by the EU Commissioner for External Relations, Ferrero-
Waldner, (cited in: Boedeltje and Van Houtum 2011, 136), are supposed to 
constitute the “weapons” (sic) for pushing neighbours toward meeting the 
requirements of the EU and adopting the norms of liberal democracies. 
Notwithstanding such a normative approach, the ‘sticks’ of conditionality 
have never been fully applied (Del Sarto-Schumacher 2005, Balfour 2009). 
The failed attempts to promote democratization in the Mediterranean are 
often justified by the scarcity of incentives: “we can’t buy reform, we are 
conscious of the fact that we don’t have the money to buy reform” (EU 
official, cited in Jones 2006, 426). European leaders repeat that “democracy 
cannot be imposed” while - according to many observers - they do not even 
try to use conditionality properly (Boedeltje and Van Houtum 2011, Kramsch 
2011). European countries have been often silent about the lack of 
democratization in some of the most preferred partners, which have even 
been praised for their achievements in this domain5. In previous years 
before the Arab revolutions, “some critics detect a return to the continent’s 
traditional approach to the region - supporting authoritarian governments in 
exchange for natural resources and stability” (Youngs 2006, 5). 
There is much ambivalence with this regard. The commitment of partner 
countries toward migration control, for example, has been included in the 
conditionality clauses of the ENP (Kausch-Youngs 2009, 966), and migrants 
readmission agreements are, in some cases, included in the Action Plans 
(Smith, 2005). Migration controls and readmission, however, often implies 
violations to the same human rights that the policy assumes as its main 
principles and goals (Fekete 2005). 
Another ambivalence regards the Eurocentric content of the “good 
governance” model that is pursued in the Mediterranean: “The Commission 
does not leave any doubts that the ‘commitment to shared values’ - such as 
democracy, liberty, rule of law, respect for human rights and human dignity - 
refers to the values of the EU and its Member States” (Del Sarto-
Schumacher 2005, 23). 
Many authors have stressed the neo-colonial nature of Euro-
Mediterranean policies (Boedeltje and Van Houtum 2011, 131), and the 
image of the Mediterranean as a post-colonial sea (Chambers 2008, 
Giaccaria-Minca 2011).  
We may say that the design of Euro-Mediterranean policies is influenced, 
on the one hand, by the colonial past of European countries that forces 
them to respect the autonomy of their partners and not to intervene too 
much in their internal politics. There is, on the other hand, the “colonial 
present” (Gregory 2004), in which European institutions “continue to think 
and to act in ways that are dyed in the colours of colonial power” (15). 
Europeans cannot resist considering European values as universal, 
intrinsically good and, therefore, superior - something that most external 
partners still do not possess but will probably adopt in the future, with the 
help of the EU and through modernization, institutional reforms and 
economic development.  
Diez defined this ambivalence as the “normative power paradox” (2006): 
notwithstanding the emphasis on “common values”, the idea that those are 
                                                 
5 A standing example is Tunisia. On a visit to the country in 2008, Sarkozy declared: 
“What other country can boast of having advanced so much in half a century on the road 
to progress, on the road to tolerance and on the road to reason?” (cited in Kausch-
Youngs 2009, 973). 
primarily European values reinforces the border between the EU and the 
outside world. The EU’s external policies - it is argued - are structured in 
such a way that non-European partners are the subjects of policies rather 
than partners (Dimitrovova 2010, 477). The EU “on the one hand creates an 
image of an inferior neighbour that urgently needs to move towards 
European standards and on the other hand produces a speech politics of 
mutuality and dialogue” (Boedeltje and Van Houtum 2011, 130). “Both the 
content and form of the initiative reinforce the asymmetry characterizing the 
two sides” (Zaiotti 2007, 151). “The approach is dominative, rather than 
universalistic or cosmopolitan” (Barbé et al. 2009, 379). Euro-Mediterranean 
policies, according to those criticisms, are reinforcing the same image of a 
“fortress Europe” that they are trying to eliminate, not only through political 
and military means, but also through “cultural bordering” (Kostadinova 2009, 
Dimitrovova 2010, Boedeltje and Van Houtum 2011, Delanty 2006). 
A clear demonstration of the above mentioned limits of European policies 
toward the Mediterranean may be found in the so called “Arab spring” (a 
Eurocentric definition itself: ‘spring’ is a concept that is hardly applicable to 
the tropical climate of Arab countries). The Arab revolutions have shown 
that democratization is a rather complex process and that we still need to 
learn how to deal with it through soft means and pro-actively, rather than 
through the ‘hard’ power of ex-post military intervention.  
Not surprisingly then, protesters in Arab countries are sceptical with 
respect to the commitment of European countries in this regard, although 
they are fighting for the same democratic ideals that the Mediterranean 
politics is promoting. They fight for our ‘common values’ but are sceptical 
toward our ‘common politics’ and while some local actors perceive Europe 
as a controversial ally, others think that it may be even an obstacle toward 
democratization: 
 
“The European Union continues to promote an agenda for trade and investments 
which has already proven to be useless for the developing needs of partner countries 
and that, if confirmed and enhanced, could seriously challenge the ongoing democratic 
transitions” (Arab NGO Network for Development, February 2012). 
 
 
 
6. EUROPE AND ITS ‘OTHER’. FREE TRADE AND EUROPEANIZATION IN THE 
MEDITERRANEAN  
 
A common spatial metaphor that is used to capture the Eurocentric 
character of Euro-Mediterranean policies, and that may be considered one 
of the main dimensions of regionalization attempts in the Mediterranean, is 
that of “Europeanization” (Jones 2006, Lavenex 2008). According to 
Featherstone and Radaelli (2003, 333), Europeanization is a set of 
“processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things,’ 
and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in 
the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
discourse, political structures and public policies”.  
Europeanization has both an internal and external dimension (Jones-Clark 
2008a). In relation to the Mediterranean, it may be regarded - inter alias - as 
a geopolitical strategy which aims to make the sea a European Mare 
Nostrum. 
Europeanization is also an attempt to replicate, in the Euro-Mediterranean 
area, the same integration model that has been experienced within the EU 
(Barbé et al. 2009, 379); to adopt, for example, the same timing and path 
toward closer integration that is applied to those countries that bid for 
accession to the EU. The prioritization of trade liberalization is a standing 
example in this regard. Enlargement, therefore, does not only represent the 
challenge that the strategy wishes to respond to but it also serves - 
somehow - as a ‘model’ for its design (Zaiotti 2007, Celata-Coletti 2011).  
Partner countries, moreover, are asked to adopt EU-specific norms, rules 
and standards. In the commercial domain, any external partner wishing to 
participate in the Free Trade Area must bring their entire regulatory system 
in-line with the acquis communitaire, although the cost of alignment with the 
acquis is enormous and may be much greater than the benefits of 
commercial integration (Del Sarto-Schumacher 2005). 
Besides regulatory convergence in the field of trade (indeed a prerequisite 
for the creation of the FTA), partners are asked to comply with other 
regulatory and institutional rules that, differently from candidate countries, 
are not justified nor exchanged within the perspective of accession to the 
EU (Barbé et al. 2009).  
Partner countries do not only express a generic commitment toward 
democratization. The Barcelona Declaration includes commitments toward 
the creation of an “environment conducive to [foreign] investments”, the 
empowering of civil society, political and administrative decentralization, “the 
promotion of the role of women in development”, etc.  
The strategy, however, is aimed at institutional convergence as well as at 
discursive isomorphism: it is constituted by ‘soft power’ and political 
imaginations rather than perspectives for ‘hard’ reforms (Bialasiewicz 2008). 
It is a postcolonial, rather than a neo-colonial, strategy. 
We may distinguish between what could be defined as “hard” 
Europeanization – the promotion of political and economic reforms in the 
partner countries – and “soft” Europeanization: the diffusion of specific 
practices, ways of doing and thinking which are imposed to those actors, in 
the partner countries, which are more directly involved in Euro-
Mediterranean policies: as Jones and Clark put it, it is “the 
microgeographies of everyday worked life of specific actors (…) which 
determine the (re-)production of Europeanization” (2008b, 309). 
Although the EU has been unable to promote any kind of political reform 
in the partner countries, beyond some regulatory convergence, they have 
otherwise succeeded in ‘framing’ Euro-Mediterranean relations according to 
a particular discourse on what those relations should look like and how they 
should evolve in the future. 
This is not to say that Europeanization does not encounter contestations 
and opposition from partner countries or from specific actors/institutions 
within those countries which repeatedly denounced the hegemonic and 
Eurocentric character of Euro-Mediterranean politics. Most of the ruling 
elites in Southern Mediterranean countries have been increasingly sceptical 
with respect to the EMP as they fear that ‘soft’ integration may generate 
spill-overs that undermine their power status (Del Sarto-Schumacher 2005, 
35). 
The result of such a controversial strategy may be defined as “selective 
Europeanization”: it succeeds mostly among those actors and social groups 
that are more directly affected by European policies as they are 
beneficiaries of EU funding, participate in the Euro-Mediterranean policy 
community or think they could be empowered by the Europeanization of 
their political system. Several actors and agencies, moreover, are directly 
created within the partner countries to implement Euro-Mediterranean 
policies; like modern-day missionaries, these actors may be regarded as 
predicators of the ‘logos’ of Europeanization.  
Euro-Mediterranean policies, and Europeanization more generally, are 
therefore not unitary but fragmented and heterogeneous processes that 
distinguish between different actors, different policy domains, in order to 
adopt a strategy of simultaneous inclusion/exclusion, openness/closure, 
cooperation/control (Berg-Ehin 2006, Walters 2006). Europeanization is, 
moreover, a contested process opposed by some local actors while 
appropriated by others, in order to be adapted to their specific interests and 
goals. 
Also within Europe, strategies toward the Mediterranean are not unitary 
but ridden with conflicts between different geopolitical priorities and different 
models of action. The making of the Euro-Mediterranean region, in this 
frame, “has become one of the critical ways in which the EU seeks to define 
itself as much as order its relations with the outside world” (Jones 2006, 
420). Struggles over the conceptualization of the Mediterranean ‘other’, are 
indeed struggles over the European ‘self’. Regionalization in the 
Mediterranean is just one of the pluralities of rescaling processes on which 
the same perspective for further integration within the EU are based.  
One of the primary issues that needs to be addressed in the EU’s 
strategies toward its external partners is the need to mediate between the 
role of the EU vis-à-vis the role of member States in foreign politics. Since 
the 1950s, the Mediterranean has been the first and most important test for 
the EU’s ability to speak with a single voice toward its external partners 
(Amoroso 2007, 502). The belief that a Mediterranean region can be ‘made’, 
in this frame, is the belief that the European region is already in the making 
and a legitimization for the EU’s increasing role in the international arena. 
This can also be regarded as a form of Europeanization: “a discourse 
production which renders logical and legitimate European interventions in 
the Mediterranean” (Jones-Clark 2008a, 567). 
If the ‘making’ of the Mediterranean is the ‘making’ of Europe, the limits of 
the former are limits to the latter. As we don’t know how Europe itself will 
evolve in the future, we cannot say how Euro-Mediterranean relations will 
look at the end of both the global economic recession and after the Arab 
revolutions. At the moment, it may be possible that Mediterranean politics 
will flourish again with concrete perspectives for the constitution of the 
Mediterranean as “an area of peace, stability and prosperity”, or they will 
continue their “slow and tortuous agonía” (Kausch-Youngs 2009, 963). In 
both cases, it is worth searching for the “alternative modernities” that the 
Mediterranean may suggest (Giaccaria-Minca 2011), to go beyond the one 
proposed so far. 
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